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OBSERVATIONS
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ABSTRACT
Issue: Medical education has “muddy zones of practice,” areas of complexity and uncertainty
that frustrate the achievement of our intended educational outcomes. Slowing down to
consider context and reflect on practice are now seen as essential to medical education as
we are called upon to examine carefully what we are doing to care for learners and improve
their performance, professionalism, and well-being. Philosophy can be seen as the funda-
mental approach to pausing at times of complexity and uncertainty to ask basic questions
about seemingly obvious practices so that we can see (and do) things in new ways.
Evidence: Philosophy and medical education have long been related; many of our basic con-
cepts can be traced to philosophical ideas. Philosophy is a problem-creation approach, and
its method is analysis; it is a constant process of shifting frames and turning into objects of
analysis the lenses through which we see the world. However, philosophy is not about con-
stant questioning for the sake of questioning. Progression in medical education practice
involves recognizing when to switch from a philosophical to a practical perspective, and
when to switch back. Implications: In medical education, a philosophical approach empow-
ers us to “slow down when we should,” thereby engaging us more directly with our sub-
jects of study, revealing our assumptions, and helping us address vexing problems from a
new angle. Doing philosophy involves thinking like a beginner, getting back to basics, and
disrupting frames of reference. Being philosophical is about wonder and intense, childlike
curiosity, human qualities we all share. Taking a philosophical approach to medical educa-
tion need not be an unguided endeavor, but can be a dialog through which medical educa-
tors and philosophers learn together.
KEYWORDS
Philosophy; humanities;
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“When a clinical presentation is atypical, a postoperative
patient goes off course, an unusual reaction occurs from
medication, or an anatomical anomaly is confronted,
will the clinician… take heed and recognize the
intricacies and complexities of the case… or will that
clinician plow through, oblivious to its uniqueness and
unaware of its consequences?”1(p.S110)
Analysis of physicians’ expert judgment suggests that
optimal performance and patient outcomes depend
on physicians’ ability to recognize “muddy zones of
practice,”2(p.1019) and “slow down” to attend to the situ-
ation, reframe the problem at hand, and take action
accordingly.1 Among surgeons, signs of slowing down
include turning off background music in the operating
room, silencing chatter, and pausing to regroup.2
Slowing down also may be proactively planned,
prompted by the surgeon’s anticipation of procedure-
and patient-specific complexities and uncertainty.2
Medical education also has its muddy zones of
practice, its own atypical presentations, unintended
outcomes, and structural abnormalities for which to
account. These areas of complexity and uncertainty
likely feel familiar to many of us: they present as per-
sistent challenges that frustrate the achievement of
our intended educational outcomes, such as balancing
learning and assessment or teaching and clinical ser-
vice. Slowing down to consider context and reflect on
practice are now seen as essential to medical educa-
tion3,4 as we are called upon to examine carefully
what we are doing to care for learners and improve
their performance, professionalism, and well-being.
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But what does “slowing down when we should”1 look
like in medical education?
Philosophy can be seen as the fundamental
approach to pausing at times of complexity and
uncertainty to ask basic questions about seemingly
obvious practices so that we can see (and do) things
in new ways. Whether we are aware of it or not, basic
concepts we use in medical education can be traced to
philosophy. For example, the idea that what we do –
in medicine or in education – should be based on sys-
tematic empirical research whereby ‘causes’ and
‘effects’ are identified can be traced back to Hume
and Locke.5 Thinking about learners in terms of
knowledge, skills, and attitudes can be traced back to
Plato and Aristotle. Models of reflection, such as
Kolb’s,6 can be traced back to John Dewey,7 who in
turn based his work on Hegel’s philosophy. Slowing
down with philosophy to reframe educational prob-
lems and take newly informed action may be seen as
a kind of expedition – a journey of exploration with a
particular purpose.
In this article, we illustrate a philosophical
approach to slowing down in medical education, dem-
onstrating how viewing a situation philosophically
helps us pause to focus our attention, reframe the
problem at hand, and take action accordingly. Next,
we outline three philosophical practices that could be
used to do philosophy in medical education. In this,
we aim to support slowing down in the moment reac-
tively to problems at hand. Finally, we describe what
it means to be philosophical in our approach to teach-
ing and learning and propose five themes as a starting
point for dialog between philosophers and medical
educators. These themes will be explored further in a
series of articles published in Teaching and Learning
in Medicine in the coming months. The aim of the
series is to support proactive slowing down by identi-
fying complexities and uncertainty in medical educa-
tion that philosophers are wrestling with now.
A philosophical approach to the problem of
resident teach back
Imagine an internal medicine residency program dir-
ector faced with a problem: observation-based assess-
ments reveal that before leaving the examination room,
residents consistently fail to “teach back,” or gauge
their patients’ understanding of their condition and
what the next steps in their treatment plan will be.8
Because teaching back has been shown to improve
patients’ health-related behaviors9 and is seen by the
residency program as an important demonstration of
the internal medicine sub-competency “communicates
effectively with patients and caregivers,”10(p20) the pro-
gram director decides to intervene.
The intervention the program director chooses
depends on how they have formulated problem at
hand. Let us say that the intervention comprises dedi-
cating a resident conference to the teach back method
and administering a simulated patient encounter to
formally develop teach back skills. In this case, the
problem has been diagnosed as a knowledge gap:
‘Trainees do not know how.’ But imagine that the
intervention is not successful, residents still do not
teach back, and the program director re-formulates
the problem as a motivational deficit: ‘Trainees know
how, but they are not motivated to do it; they do not
understand why it is important.’ To convince resi-
dents of the value of teach back, the program director
then selects a meta-analysis documenting the positive
outcomes of teach back to be discussed at the next
internal medicine journal club.
In our example so far, the program director has
seen residents’ failure to enact satisfactory doctor-
patient communication as a lack of requisite know-
ledge, skills, and attitudes. This seems obvious. But
being philosophical is about questioning the obvious,
so let us do that together here and see what happens:
How does the resident experience the task of teaching
back? Do they see a problem, and if so, how do they
define it? The resident may be seen as entering the
exam room embodying multiple, potentially conflict-
ing roles: learner and practitioner. Their relationship
to the patient and whether this is conducive to teach
back may depend on how they navigate these roles.
For instance, in order to teach back, the resident may
need to feel ownership of the patient’s care,11 yet resi-
dents know they must verify what they do with the
attending, who is ultimately responsible. Moreover,
the attending is the more experienced practitioner,
who may disagree with the resident’s plan. In this
context, teaching back, especially if the plan later
needs correcting, may constitute a breach of role
boundaries: acting like a practitioner when one is in
fact a trainee. If the problem of teach back is one of
role conflict, it calls for an intervention aimed at clari-
fying and navigating role boundaries; intervention
aimed at knowledge or motivation would not work.
This way of approaching the problem differs from
the previous one in that it disrupts the program direc-
tor’s frame of reference, a classic philosophical move.
The resident is no longer approached as an assem-
blage of knowledge, skills, and attitudes, but as a
thinking, acting being, which has implications for
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what to do next. Instead of concluding ‘We need an
intervention,’ the program director may step back and
reimagine the problem, wondering ‘Why don’t resi-
dents teach back?’ and, more generally, ‘How can we
help residents achieve high quality patient communi-
cation?’ We already see numerous examples of this
kind analysis in the medical education literature,
which not only disrupt our assumptions about learn-
ers but also demonstrate that our community has a
certain readiness to approach problems in medical
education philosophically.
We now have three possible explanations for why a
behavior expected of residents does not take place.
Each of these explanations defines the problem in a
certain way: as a communication knowledge/skill def-
icit, a motivational issue, and a role conflict. We may
note that none of these definitions is necessarily truer
than the other; after questioning the obvious and dis-
entangling a problem from how it is viewed, philoso-
phers are quick to disown the idea of finding the
‘right’ lens or framework, or to pretend that we can
see the world ‘as it is’ without a lens or framework.
The residents in our example may in fact need devel-
opment of their teach back skills, but residents may
not practice teach back because they are not moti-
vated, and they may not be motivated because they
seek to avoid role conflict.
(Some) new problems no one looked for
Let us imagine (perhaps readily) that despite identify-
ing barriers to teach back and forming a response to
address them, observational assessment of residents
shows that their behavior still fails to meet expecta-
tions. Because medical education is interdisciplinary,
the program director may recruit imported concepts
and ways of thinking from medical science, cognitive
psychology, educational science, and many other disci-
plines to solve this problem.12–14 However, these differ-
ent perspectives bring with them assumptions that
might be incongruent with the aims of intervening or
incompatible with each other. Raising philosophical
questions about the interplay of power and knowledge,
about the clash of learning and assessment priorities,
even about the very nature of causality and progress
may reveal buried and conflicting assumptions that
underlie the recurrence of the teach back problem.
Through language, knowledge serves power
Perhaps our program director decides to examine resi-
dent-patient communication directly, approaching the
project from the perspective of philosopher Michel
Foucault (himself the son of a physician). A
Foucauldian lens15,16 would introduce two new per-
spectives on authority from which to view the prob-
lem at hand. The first perspective involves viewing
authority in linguistic terms, as something that con-
strains who gets to say what and who can define key
elements of the doctor-patient relationship, such as
the diagnosis and the treatment plan. The second per-
spective involves viewing authority not as something
one has, but something one does, and this depends on
the kind of knowledge and information one can use.
From this perspective we see the resident, patient, and
attending as situated within a power-knowledge net-
work;15 knowledge is power enacted through what can
be said and by whom.
Reconsidering our example now, the Shared
Decision-Making framework,17,18 of which teach back
is one component, defines health care as a shared pro-
ject of doctor and patient, but in the resident’s situ-
ation the attending also participates. Examination of
this group’s communication may reveal that the
attending physician is the one who leads the inter-
action when all three parties are in the room, defining
how long the exchange lasts (e.g., by being the first
person to say “goodbye”) and what topics it covers
(e.g., by being the one to ask questions). Viewing
these interactions from the Foucauldian perspective
may prompt the program director to shift the problem
frame from ‘How can we intervene to make residents
teach back?’ or ‘Why does the resident not teach
back?’ to ‘Why is it even a problem that residents,
who lack power in this situation, do not teach back?’
Assessment or learning?
Taking a philosophical stance, the program director
also may ask: ‘Do we assess residents’ teach back
because it (1) ensures quality patient care; (2) facili-
tates the development of patient-communication com-
petency; or (3) describes a resident behavior that we
can evaluate readily with available instruments?’ This
question implies that it may not be enough for resi-
dents to be empathetic doctors,19 or, in this case,
effective communicators. They have to be seen as
such, and this can only occur if they act in a way that
is observable to the assessor. And even that is not
enough; the assessor must translate their observations
into the predefined structure of an assessment form.20
In this, we see the competition between two dis-
courses, that of doctor-patient communication (what
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we want the resident to learn) and that of assessment
(how we know the resident learned it).
The philosophical concept of ‘instrumental think-
ing’21,22 is relevant here. Philosophers have broadly
distinguished two main ways of thinking: instrumental
(or technical) rationality and value rationality.
Instrumental rationality calls us to see the world in
terms of ends that should be achieved as efficiently as
possible. Value rationality, by contrast, calls us to
relate to the world in a more holistic sense. These
ways of thinking represent fundamentally different
approaches of relating to the world, determining not
just how we think but also how we feel and act. Our
program director’s question illustrates how instrumen-
tal thinking and value rationality may clash; teach
back may reflect a more holistic notion of patient
care, but its assessment may impose constraints on
what constitutes teach back in order to evaluate train-
ees efficiently.
Recognizing this clash prompts the philosophical
medical educator to slow down and analyze seemingly
obvious practices and, buried beneath those, instru-
mental assumptions about skill and performance. We
may discover that an assessment lens filters out resi-
dent practices that balance patient communication
and skill development because they are not observable,
measurable behaviors captured by assessment instru-
ments.23 Approaching teach back from a value ration-
ality perspective may prompt the program director to
ponder new questions: ‘What is the ultimate purpose
of teach back, and are there other practices that doc-
tors in training can use to accomplish this goal?’ ‘Are
our residents already doing these practices, but we fail
to see it using our assessment instruments?’
Doing philosophy
There is a movement in medical education encourag-
ing us to accept ambiguity as a part of becoming a doc-
tor, rather than a sign that our training system is not
working.24,25 Modern philosophers like De Beauvoir
have embraced ambiguity as a positive quality, poten-
tially fundamental to human existence.26 Perhaps toler-
ance for ambiguity is needed to become medical
educators. Indeed, in medical education there is rarely a
moment when we do not deal with ambiguity, and
there is reason to suspect that one’s ability to tolerate it
is positively related to psychological well-being.27
Hopefully, our illustration of viewing complexities and
uncertainty in medical education philosophically has
stimulated enthusiasm to slow down and wrestle with
questions about why medical education is the way it is
and, in so doing, see things anew and take productive
action. Doing philosophy often involves engaging
ambiguity by way of philosophical practices: points of
entry for philosophizing helpfully about our educa-
tional efforts.
The first philosophical practice we suggest is to pay
attention to what is happening and assume a begin-
ner’s mind, even if one is experienced. This is exem-
plified in the well-known saying (often misattributed
to Socrates) “All I know is that I know nothing.”
Rather than achieving mastery, this first practice is
aimed at the urge to “slow down” in the face of com-
plexity or uncertainty, a hallmark of expertise.1 In our
example, when observational assessments continued to
show, despite intervention, that residents were failing
to teach back, the program director paused to ques-
tion whether this was in fact attributable to know-
ledge, skill, or motivational deficits, and later, to
question what made this ‘problem’ a problem in the
first place. As another example, before asking the
question ‘How will we assess this new program?’ this
philosophical move—thinking like a beginner—gives
us the space to ask ‘Do we want to assess this pro-
gram, and, if so – why?’19
A second philosophical practice is to lead a prob-
lem back to its most fundamental description,
prompting assumptions to reveal themselves. If our
program director kept seeing learners in terms of
knowledge, skills, and attitudes, they would not have
discovered the power dynamics in attending-resident
relationships that might prevent residents from taking
ownership of patient care. A guide in this practice is
what Deleuze and Guattari call the first principle of
philosophy: “Universals explain nothing, but must
themselves be explained.”28 (p.6) If a reason for inter-
vening is because it is ‘good,’ because it is ‘evidence-
based,’ or because that is how students ‘learn,’ doing
philosophy involves asking: What do you mean by
‘good,’ by ‘evidence,’ or by ‘learning?’ In this way, the
most obvious and basic concepts we have in medical
education can become objects of analysis in them-
selves. This philosophical practice—getting back to the
basics—could also be enacted by asking: ‘What ques-
tion can be formulated that involves me, the ques-
tioner?’ For instance, the question ‘How can I get my
trainees to learn?’ if asked philosophically could
become: ‘How do I see myself as an educator and
what are the implications of my perspective for what
learning is?’
The third practice, served by the preceding two, is
to disrupt frames of reference. Viewing something
from a different perspective—whether by imagining
4 M. VEEN AND A. T. CIANCIOLO
what a problem looks like through someone else’s
eyes or by talking to someone with completely differ-
ent sight—can reveal one’s own assumptions or
default lens. For example, in one of the Socratic
Dialogs described by Plato, Socrates speaks with
Euthypro, who is about to prosecute his father.
Euthypro presents his case as obvious, but through a
series of questions Socrates assumes an attitude of
ignorance and invites Eurthypro, who claims “accurate
knowledge of all such matters,” to “teach” him.29(p.6)
This disrupts Euthypro’s frame of reference, forcing
him to switch from a routine attitude in which values
such as justice are taken as unproblematic to having
to explain them. In our teach back example, it is the
persistence of a problem that prompts the program
director to take on different perspectives, to seek out
residents’ points of view, and finally to observe com-
munication directly. Consequently, frames of reference
were disrupted multiple times: from the resident as an
object to a subject; from authority as something one
has to something one does; and finally, from teach
back as a problem the program director observes from
a distance, to one that is shaped by their own views.
Being philosophical
“The philosopher’s treatment of a question is like the
treatment of an illness.”30 (§255)
Philosophy begins with the desire to understand
something that is important to oneself, and with a dis-
satisfaction or even frustration with current ways of
thinking. In this way, philosophy is an extension of
those human qualities that are also at the root of sci-
entific and technical advancement. However, philoso-
phy remains close to questions, keeping them alive
with intense, childlike curiosity and desire to under-
stand. For example, in addressing a question such as
‘What is good education?’ a philosopher might invoke
educational, psychological, neurological perspectives to
consider instructional strategies, but then also go on to
examine the terms ‘good’ and ‘educational’ from polit-
ical, historical, linguistic, logical, and even spiritual per-
spectives. Philosophy can be seen as a form of inquiry
that is not bound to any one lens or discipline. In this
sense, it can act as a broker or negotiator between the
different perspectives we have imported to medical
education, leading us back to basic assumptions, pro-
viding common ground to think from rather than fuel-
ing debate between opposing views.
Plato’s Allegory of the Cave illustrates how being
liberated from the chains of our assumptions can be
instrumental.31 In this allegory, prisoners have been
chained inside a cave for their entire lives, watching
worldly forms dance on the cave wall. The prisoners
do not realize that they are watching a projection,
that they are seeing the shadows of objects being car-
ried in front of a fire behind them. For them, the
shadows are the objects. The prisoners learn that the
world of shadows is an illusion only when they are
released from their chains, turn around to discover
the fire, and see the actual objects whose shadows
they watched.31 Being philosophical medical educators
should prompt us to stand up, turn around, and see
what objective we are trying to accomplish with edu-
cation anew.
The aim of being philosophical is not to come up
with ‘a philosophy,’ such as a theory or an ethical
system to live by. If anything, philosophy is a problem-
creation approach, and its method is analysis, a constant
process of shifting frames and turning into objects of
analysis the lenses through which we see the world.
Being philosophical involves asking unanswerable ques-
tions and exploring ways in which one might go about
answering them. The moment this process arrives at
‘an answer,’ the project becomes the charge of another
discipline. For instance, the evidence-based medicine
movement can be seen as a scientific answer to an epis-
temological question: What kind of knowledge can we
rely on to guide our actions in patient care? Many
thinkers have devoted their life to imagining how phil-
osophy is a “pathway”21(p.445) for thinking, thinking that
“does not come to a halt”22(p.278) in a theoretical or
conceptual framework.
However, constant questioning also is a pitfall. We
cannot constantly assume a philosophical attitude and
be practical at the same time. As Nietzsche himself
wrote: “I would die if I had to formulate the deepest
reason for breathing before each breath I take.”32(p.21)
The challenge to a philosophical medical educator is
to identify the point where progression necessitates
applying incomplete, but compelling results of philo-
sophical observation and analyses.
Moving forward
We offer here our undisguised hope that this article
inspires more frequent philosophical analyses of the
complexities and uncertainties that challenge medical
education. Popular philosophy, such as the books by
Alain de Botton33 and This is Water, 34 and the pod-
casts Philosophize This!35 and the BBC’s In Our
Time: Philosophy,36 provide accessible, yet rigorous
entry points for exploration. These are, however, gen-
eral and likely require collaboration with philosophers
TEACHING AND LEARNING IN MEDICINE 5
to apply to medical education. For this reason, we aim
to start a dialog between philosophers and medical
educators via a series of articles that examine key
areas in medical education using a philosophical
approach. Five themes currently are planned for
future discussion.
Perhaps the most fundamental theme connecting
philosophy and medicine is mortality. The “questions
intersecting life, death, and meaning, questions that all
people face at some point, usually arise in a medical
context.”37(p.70) Moreover, mortality is the ‘soil’ in
which medical education is grounded, for if we were
not mortal, we would not need health care. Out of
this ground rises the question: How can we support
medical trainees in navigating professional/technical
and empathetic/humane ways of thinking in medi-
cine? Kalanithi eloquently expressed this dilemma
with respect to cadaver dissection, writing that all of
medicine “trespasses into sacred spheres. Doctors …
see people at their most vulnerable, their most scared,
their most private… Seeing the body as matter and
mechanism is the flip side to easing the most pro-
found human suffering. By the same token, the most
profound human suffering becomes a mere peda-
gogical tool.”37(p.49) How could philosophy help us
help trainees (and their educators) maintain humanity
in the face of existential questions and taboos?38
The second theme concerns the ‘hierarchy of evi-
dence’ and the concept of ‘best’ evidence—the founda-
tions of evidence-based medicine39 and medical
education40—which link epistemology and philosophy
of science to standards of medical care. The evidence-
based movement rests upon these epistemological
assertions, these claims regarding the appropriate
kinds and relative value of knowledge. Students and
physicians aiming to practice evidence-based medicine
are instructed to integrate ‘best’ evidence, based on
scientific research, with clinical expertise in order to
reach clinical decisions. Yet, these people are given no
clear guidance regarding how such integration should
occur. How would analyzing medical epistemology
help us reimagine evidence-based practice?41
Language is a third theme connecting philosophers
and medical educators. As educators know, talk and
interaction may be the most important pedagogical
tools at their disposal. But language is pervasive: the
words we use shape our world. From the standpoint
of linguistic philosophy, the single most beneficial
insight that still has to land in medical education is
that language in the workplace is usually for doing
things, for achieving goals.30 Recognizing this involves
a shift from seeing language as a neutral framework
for representing the world and communicating cogni-
tions to a view of language as performative: a way of
accomplishing social action.42,43 What are the implica-
tions of this for educational practice?
The fourth theme is control and causality. A core
assumption underlying medical education is that we
can control attention, motivation, learning, develop-
ment, and patient care through pedagogy. What
exactly is the relationship between teaching and learn-
ing in medicine? Does teaching cause learning ‘in the
student,’ in the way that a clinical intervention causes
a somatic effect in the patient? Because medical edu-
cation exists at the intersection of medicine and educa-
tion, this may be an area in which unhelpful assumptions
have been imported from medical science.44,45
The fifth theme is the relationship between mind
and world. The way we conceptualize the relationship
between physicality, neurology, and psychology has
implications for how we see physicians’ (and patients’)
relationship to patients’ bodies and related matters,
such as patient autonomy and shared decision mak-
ing.46 Mind-body dualism, associated with Descartes’
philosophy,47 permeates the medical approach to
health issues. But often, patients might experience this
in a more holistic way; medical interventions such as
prosthetics or brain surgery not only affect patients’
bodies, but also the way they relate to their bodies
and to themselves.46 Similarly, our thinking about
learning and the curriculum in medical education is
shaped by seeing learners as minds enclosed bodies,
making artificial distinctions between mind/body,
emotions/thoughts, language/actions, and so on.48
Reexamining medicine’s philosophical heritage in
Cartesian Dualism may allow us to expand our under-
standing of what it means to be a doctor rather than
just doing what a doctor does.49
Conclusion
Medical education has long had a relationship with
philosophy. A philosophical approach can advance
medical education today by helping us slow down in
the face of complexities and uncertainty, see old prob-
lems in new ways, and take productive action. Doing
philosophy involves thinking like a beginner, getting
back to the basics, and disrupting frames of reference.
Philosophy is not about creating ‘a philosophy,’ i.e.,
settling on a useful conceptual frame with which to
organize the world. Rather, it is a “pathway” for
thinking that “does not come to rest.” Yet, philosophy
in medical education is not meant to question con-
stantly simply for the sake of questioning. Instead,
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engaging with philosophy is meant to be helpful; it is
about liberation from habitual ways of thinking and
assumptions that underlie dissatisfying or even frus-
trating inability to progress. Ultimately, being philo-
sophical is about wonder and intense, childlike
curiosity, human qualities we all share. In identifying
problems no one looked for, philosophy has empow-
ered us for two and a half millennia to
search ourselves.
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